Geopolitics and geostrategy · 2019–2026
University of Gdańsk
Faculty of Economics · Institute of Foreign Trade
Master's thesis
Igor Miasnikow
Supervisor
Dr Monika Grottel
Sopot 2019
136 pp.
01Report
Figures from the document metadata and the bibliography. The thesis draws on first-hand sources: interviews and expert talks that I conducted or organised in 2016–2019.
Defended in October 2019, three years before Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine and today's situation. The foreign policy of the Russian Federation explained through geopolitics and geoeconomics. The thesis sets the historical hegemonic cycles of sea and land powers against the rivalry between the United States and China, and then shows how Russia, economically weaker than China and militarily weaker than the United States, uses geography, A2/AD anti-access systems, information warfare, and energy and transport projects (Nord Stream 2, TurkStream, the Northern Sea Route, the North-South corridor) to rebuild its spheres of influence in Eurasia. Its added value lies in personal sources obtained by the author, including conversations with Radosław Sikorski and Gen. Waldemar Skrzypczak and a talk by Gen. Stanisław Koziej at the 2nd edition of Geopolityczna Gra Mocarstw.
Citation (Chicago)
Miasnikow, Igor. “Geostrategia i projekty gospodarcze jako determinanty polityki zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej w Eurazji” [Geostrategy and economic projects as determinants of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in Eurasia]. Master's thesis, University of Gdańsk, Faculty of Economics, Institute of Foreign Trade, Sopot 2019.
Click a name to open the interview card with its context and, where one exists, the recording.
02Predictive model
The thesis does more than describe Russian policy: from premises about geography, hegemonic cycles and connectivity it derives mechanisms, scenarios and forecasts. Here it is broken down into the research problem, the method, the steps of the reasoning and the concepts it rests on.
In an increasingly polycentric world, the Russian Federation shapes its foreign policy through infrastructure projects: pipelines, transport corridors and sea routes build economic ties with other states and extend Russia's spheres of political and institutional influence.
Research questions
Aim: The thesis reconstructs the Russian perspective on foreign policy “in order to show how NATO states can respond” to the directions of Russian expansion.
Realism and geographic determinism
The starting point: “Geography determines the way capital is accumulated, the way foreign policy is conducted and the character of a state's internal system of government.”
Hegemonic cycles
A historical and comparative analysis: Wallerstein's world-system and the Kitchin, Juglar, Kuznets and Kondratiev cycles. The author's own seven-phase model of the hegemonic cycle, and a critique of Wallerstein for leaving Spain out as a hegemon.
Operational geography
Gates, corridors and chokepoints as seen by Mackinder, Brzezinski, Moczulski and Cohen: from trade straits to the Brest Gate.
Data and documents
EIA, BP Statistical Review 2019, Gazprom Export, SIPRI, UNCTAD, Rosstat, TradingEconomics and Kremlin documents. Three of the six charts are the author's own.
Expert interviews
Conversations and talks, including with Radosław Sikorski, Gen. Waldemar Skrzypczak, Gen. Stanisław Koziej, Gen. Mieczysław Cieniuch and Andrey Kortunov of the Russian International Affairs Council.
Scenario forecasting
The conclusion turns the analysis into two development scenarios and specific forecasts. These are what this page puts to the test.
Six steps that the scenarios and forecasts follow from: three premises, two mechanisms and their application to Poland. Each step shows how the forecasts I derived from it have fared.
Premise · ch. I
Sea powers extend their influence linearly or at discrete points, through bases at the chokepoints of trade routes. Land powers do so through rings of buffer zones, with a “besieged fortress syndrome” and centralised power. Russia, which lost its buffers and about half of its population after 1991, will seek to rebuild them.
Forecasts from this step
Confirmed:0Partly accurate:2Refuted:1Premise · ch. I–II
A hegemonic cycle lasts 100-150 years, and hegemony rests on financial and technological innovation. US primacy, built on control of nodal points and the global commons, has been waning since the 2007/2008 crisis. Since 2018 a “creeping confrontation” with China has been under way – the initial phase of a hegemonic war – and a Kindleberger trap looms over the system.
Forecasts from this step
Confirmed:1Partly accurate:3Refuted:0Premise · ch. II–III
Rivalry turns to supply chains, energy and the flows of finance, technology, knowledge and talent. China's Belt and Road infrastructure competes with the American advantage in software, 5G and artificial intelligence become geopolitical levers, and the chokepoints of the Middle East become the most sensitive points of the system.
Forecasts from this step
Confirmed:2Partly accurate:1Refuted:0Mechanism · ch. III–IV
Russia lags behind China economically and the United States militarily. It compensates with an arc of A2/AD anti-access systems from the Kola Peninsula through Kaliningrad and Crimea to Syria and Libya, with information warfare aimed at the “mental infrastructure” of societies, with a nuclear “de-escalation” doctrine and with an army that the Serdyukov and Shoigu reforms prepared to win a regional war.
Forecasts from this step
Confirmed:2Partly accurate:0Refuted:3Mechanism · ch. IV
Under the Falin-Kvitsinsky doctrine, energy dependence takes the place of military presence. Europe took 54.5% of Russian exports (2018), so the pipelines – Yamal, Druzhba, Nord Stream, TurkStream, Blue Stream – tie it to Russia. The Northern Sea Route and the North-South corridor with Iran and India are meant to make Russia the hub of Eurasia's corridors rather than a stop on the Chinese route.
Forecasts from this step
Confirmed:2Partly accurate:2Refuted:3Application · ch. III
Poland lies on the Baltic-Black Sea isthmus, and its operational geography – the Elbląg Upland, the Suwałki Gap, the Brest Gate some 150 km from Warsaw, the Przemyśl Gate and Podolia – makes it the axis of any conflict on the eastern flank. Gotland and Bornholm decide the Baltic. “Without Polish territory nothing can be decided in the area of the Central European Plain.”
Forecasts from this step
Confirmed:3Partly accurate:0Refuted:0Output of the model
Two development scenarios and specific forecasts. I selected 25 testable forecasts from the thesis and set them against events up to 24 October 2026.
The thesis's vocabulary: this is the sense in which the terms appear in its theses and forecasts.
03Theses
The main theses of the four chapters and the conclusion. Where a forecast tests a thesis, its number and verdict appear next to it; a click opens the reasoning and the sources.
pp. 6-31
The era of land and sea powers, the hegemonic cycles of Spain, the Netherlands and England, the Anglo-Saxon economic order, and the rivalry between the British Empire and the German Empire.
Sea powers extend their influence linearly or at discrete points, through bases at the chokepoints of trade routes; land powers through rings of buffer zones, with a “besieged fortress syndrome” and centralised power.
Hegemony rests on financial and monetary innovation (Amsterdam, London) and on technological superiority.
A hegemonic cycle lasts 100-150 years. The thesis proposes its own model of the cycle's seven phases and takes issue with Wallerstein, who leaves Spain out as a hegemon.
pp. 32-64
US primacy, the Middle East as an arena of great-power rivalry, and the factors that destabilise the international order.
US primacy rests on control of nodal points and the global commons.
The unipolar moment ended with the 2007/2008 crisis. Since 2018 a “creeping confrontation” between the United States and China has been under way – the initial phase of a hegemonic war.
China's Belt and Road infrastructure (hardware) competes with the American advantage in software; 5G and artificial intelligence become geopolitical levers.
The Middle East shows “as in a mirror” the rivalry of the great powers – from the Strait of Hormuz to the gas of the Eastern Mediterranean.
A Kindleberger trap looms, and “the world is entering an era of land-power politics”.
pp. 65-96
Power projection, the southern theatre and the European theatre, including Poland's operational geography.
After 1991 Russia lost its buffers and about half of its population. It treats the Near Abroad as an exclusive sphere of influence, on the model of the Monroe Doctrine.
An A2/AD arc from the Kola Peninsula through Kaliningrad and Crimea to Syria and Libya constrains NATO's power projection.
The Serdyukov and Shoigu reforms gave the army the capability to win a regional war; Russia has a nuclear “de-escalation” doctrine.
The southern direction – the Caucasus, Turkey and Syria with the base at Tartus – is the main vector of Russian economic expansion.
Poland's operational geography: the Elbląg Upland, the Suwałki Gap, the Brest Gate some 150 km from Warsaw, the Przemyśl Gate and Podolia. According to Gen. Waldemar Skrzypczak, Russian planning assumes reaching the Vistula in 2-3 days and the Oder in 10.
Gotland and Bornholm decide the Baltic, and “without Polish territory nothing can be decided in the area of the Central European Plain”.
pp. 97-121
Asymmetric action, the “energy superpower”, the Asian Near Abroad with the Northern Sea Route, and the Far Abroad with attempts to break China's continental hegemony.
Russia gravitates economically towards Europe: in 2018 Europe took 54.5% of its exports and Asia 36.8%.
Information warfare targets the “mental infrastructure” of societies.
The Falin-Kvitsinsky doctrine – energy dependence instead of military presence – is pursued through the Yamal, Druzhba, Nord Stream 1 and 2, TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines. Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream are meant to marginalise transit through Ukraine.
A Russian-German strategic partnership could co-shape the rules of the Belt and Road. The counterweights are the Three Seas Initiative as a cordon sanitaire, American LNG and the Central Communication Port (CPK).
In Central Asia, Russia is responsible for security and China for the economy.
The 2018 Caspian Convention confirmed Russia's dominance. The Northern Sea Route and the North-South corridor (Russia-Iran-India) are Russia's answer to the Belt and Road.
The intervention in Syria protects Russian energy contracts.
p. 122
Synthesis: the end of globalisation in its existing form, Russia's strategic goal, two scenarios and the forecasts.
“Globalisation in its current form is coming to an end”, and the world is becoming polycentric.
Russia seeks the role of a third geostrategic pole – the hub of Eurasia's corridors – and tries to avoid the position of China's junior partner.
Russia's strategic goal is the reach of the Russian Empire before the Third Partition of Poland, plus a “Novorossiya” extending to Transnistria and the mouth of the Danube.
Two development scenarios depend on whether Russia builds the north-south axis.
“The future war will be a protracted war”.
By 2026 the Union State of Russia and Belarus is to give way to a new political entity, allowing Vladimir Putin to take the presidency again.
Quotes
“Connectivity is the new paradigm of the global order. Geopolitical rivalry is evolving from war over territory towards wars over connectivity, that is, control of the global supply chain, the energy market, and the key flows of finance, technology, knowledge and talent.”
“Geography determines the way capital is accumulated, the way foreign policy is conducted and the character of a state's internal system of government.”
“It is Poland that is the main centre of gravity, and without Polish territory nothing can be decided in the area of the Central European Plain.”
“The Middle East reflects, as in a mirror, the relations between the powers competing in the international arena. The world is entering an era of land-power politics.”
“The Russians will always build their investment strategies on the factor of geographic space, which does not lose its importance in an age when infrastructure is moving into the cyber domain.”
04Forecast check
I set each forecast from the thesis against events up to 24 October 2026 and against open sources. A row opens the 2019 reasoning, the grounds for the verdict and the source links.
Forecasts from 2019 put to the test
25
state of events as of 24 October 2026
Weighted hit rate
56%
confirmed = 1, partly accurate = 0.5, refuted = 0
| Confirmed | 10 (40%) |
|---|---|
| Partly accurate | 8 (32%) |
| Refuted | 7 (28%) |
Pick an area to narrow the list.
| War and security | Confirmed: 5 | Partly accurate: 1 | Refuted: 2 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Energy | Confirmed: 1 | Partly accurate: 1 | Refuted: 2 |
| Eurasia and corridors | Confirmed: 1 | Partly accurate: 3 | Refuted: 1 |
| Middle East and Caucasus | Confirmed: 2 | Partly accurate: 0 | Refuted: 2 |
| Global order and Russia | Confirmed: 1 | Partly accurate: 3 | Refuted: 0 |
05The verdict
The answer in three layers: the overall hit rate, the scenarios from the conclusion of the thesis set against reality, and a balance sheet by subject area.
Weighted hit rate of the model
56%
confirmed = 1, partly accurate = 0.5, refuted = 0
The 2019 model best predicted what follows from geography and military capabilities: a long war, the importance of the Baltic and of Poland, a missile race and the vulnerability of chokepoints. Its weakest assumptions were that energy interdependence would bind Russia to Europe and that Russia would stay below the threshold of open war. In 2026 the mechanism of the first scenario also kicked in: a United States overstretched by the war with Iran is softening its line on Russia, though a New Concert of Powers is still a long way off.
Scenario 1
Related forecasts
Scenario 2
Related forecasts
Reality
Russia took a path that the thesis did not write up as a separate scenario, although it contained its elements: the “Novorossiya” goal, an advance from the Kursk arc and the forecast of a long war. The full-scale invasion of 2022 severed energy ties with Europe, accelerated NATO's enlargement in the north and deepened the asymmetry with China. Since February 2026 the United States has also been fighting a war with Iran, splitting dwindling stocks of interceptor missiles between two theatres. Europe has taken on the main burden of aid, but according to the Kiel Institute it has only limited alternatives to the American Patriot systems on which Ukraine's defence against Russian ballistic missiles depends.
Related forecasts
Areas ordered from the most accurate. The hit rate is calculated in the same way as for the whole model.
The strongest part of the model. Operational geography and the assessment of capabilities correctly pointed to a long war, the importance of the Baltic and Gotland, a permanent US presence in Poland, a missile race after the INF Treaty and Poland's need to rearm. 2026 added further confirmation: the United States is pulling some forces out of Germany while promising more for Poland, and Europe is buying long-range weapons itself. The assumption that Russia would stay below the threshold of open war, and the fear of NATO splitting, proved wrong.
No New Concert of Powers has emerged, but in 2026 the mechanism that foreshadowed it kicked in: a United States stretched across two theatres is easing sanctions on Russia, while deliveries to Ukraine are delayed. The diagnosis of waning US primacy proved right. Forecasts about Russia itself got the outcome right but not always the route: Putin remained president thanks to a constitutional change rather than a union state, and after the war-driven boom the economy slipped back into stagnation.
Right direction, overestimated scale. The asymmetry with China deepened as forecast, and the war with Iran has widened it further. The Northern Sea Route keeps setting records, but in 2026 it will reach about half of the target set for 2024. The North-South corridor still awaits its missing link, whose construction the war has pushed back to 2027, and Central Asia's new routes bypass Russia.
Right mechanisms, overestimated Russian positions. The Middle East proved to be the “mirror” of great-power rivalry: first the Red Sea and then, in 2026, the Strait of Hormuz showed how vulnerable chokepoints are, and Moscow supported Iran only indirectly while profiting from dearer oil. Yet by 2024 Russia had lost the strongholds in Syria and Armenia on which the southern-direction thesis rested, and in 2026 the CSTO's secretary general said Armenia had in effect left the organisation.
The weakest part of the model. It assumed that gas interdependence would bind Russia to Europe for years. Europe cut it back within three years thanks to LNG and adopted a regulation to phase out imports; not even the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz made the EU back down, and American LNG now covers nearly two-thirds of the EU's LNG imports. What followed from geography proved right: Turkey's role and the end of transit through Ukraine, albeit through a different mechanism.
06Corridors and chokepoints
Gas pipelines, overland corridors, the Arctic route and the straits analysed in the thesis – with the chapter that discusses them, the 2019 figures and links to the forecasts that concern them.
| Route | Course | In the thesis (2019) | Forecast check |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gas pipelines | |||
| Nord Stream 1 and 2 | Russia (Gulf of Finland) → Baltic seabed → Germany (Lubmin) | ch. IVNord Stream 2: 55 bcm a year | |
| TurkStream | Russia (Anapa) → Black Sea seabed → Turkey; European string via the Balkans | ch. IV31.5 bcm a year | |
| Blue Stream | Russia (Dzhubga) → Black Sea seabed → Turkey (Samsun) | ch. IV | |
| Yamal–Europe | Russia → Belarus → Poland → Germany | ch. IV | – |
| Power of Siberia 2 | Russia (Western Siberia) → Mongolia → China | ch. IV | |
| Overland corridors | |||
| North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) | Russia → Caspian Sea → Iran → India | ch. IV7,200 km; Mumbai–Moscow in 20 days | |
| Belt and Road Initiative – overland route | China → Kazakhstan → Russia → Belarus → Poland → Western Europe | ch. IIChina–Europe rail: 15–19 days against 37–50 days by sea | |
| Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian) | China → Kazakhstan → Caspian Sea → South Caucasus → Turkey, bypassing Russia | ch. IV | |
| Sea route | |||
| Northern Sea Route | Barents Sea → Russia's Arctic coast → Bering Strait | ch. IV18 Mt of cargo in 2018; target: 80 Mt in 2024 | |
| Chokepoints | |||
| Bosphorus and Dardanelles | Black Sea ↔ Mediterranean (Turkey) | ch. III | |
| Suez Canal | Mediterranean ↔ Red Sea (Egypt) | ch. II | |
| Bab el-Mandeb | Red Sea ↔ Gulf of Aden (Yemen, Djibouti) | ch. II | |
| Strait of Hormuz | Persian Gulf ↔ Arabian Sea (Iran, Oman) | ch. II21% of oil tonnage and 25% of LNG (EIA, 2018) | |
| Strait of Malacca | Indian Ocean ↔ South China Sea (Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore) | ch. II39.5% of China's maritime trade | – |
| Suwałki Gap | Poland ↔ Lithuania, between the Kaliningrad region and Belarus | ch. III | |
07Publications
Texts published after the thesis develop its findings: Poland's position in great-power rivalry and Russia's operational directions.
Zeszyty Studenckie “Nasze Studia”, Faculty of Economics, University of Gdańsk, no. 9, pp. 147-161
Since 2018 the United States has been competing for primacy in the international system with China, the aspiring hegemon, while Russia, weaker economically and demographically, retains influence thanks to its military potential, location, spheres of influence and raw materials. The article derives Poland's position from this configuration: the complementary interests of Western Europe and Russia pose a challenge to Poland, and its location makes it a player in the strategy of every great power. Within the US sphere of influence Poland plays the role of a military player vis-à-vis Russia; in Chinese initiatives it is seen as a logistics and transport hub between Europe and China.
Citation (Chicago)
Miasnikow, Igor. “Wpływ globalnej gry mocarstw na Polskę” [The impact of the global game of great powers on Poland]. Zeszyty Studenckie “Nasze Studia”, no. 9 (2019): 147-161.
The Geopolitics of Russia and the Post-Soviet Area: Spheres of Influence (Geopolityka Rosji i obszaru postsowieckiego. Strefy wpływów), vol. 1, ed. Leszek Sykulski, Wydawnictwo Zona Zero
A chapter in an edited monograph on the geopolitics of Russia and the post-Soviet area (584 pages, published on 16 September 2020), alongside texts by Michał Lubina, Piotr Mickiewicz and Krzysztof Wojczal, among others. It analyses Russian operational directions and Russia's capacity to project power and secure its spheres of influence in Europe and on the southern axis; it develops the findings of Chapter III of the master's thesis.
Citation (Chicago)
Miasnikow, Igor. “Kierunki operacyjne w geostrategii Federacji Rosyjskiej” [Operational directions in the geostrategy of the Russian Federation]. In Geopolityka Rosji i obszaru postsowieckiego. Strefy wpływów [The geopolitics of Russia and the post-Soviet area: Spheres of influence], vol. 1, edited by Leszek Sykulski. Zona Zero, 2020.
LinkedIn newsletter
An analytical newsletter under the conference brand. The first issue, published a month after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, describes the main Russian operational directions in Europe and the Middle East and points readers to three 2020 analyses published on the Historyczny Ambasador blog.
Citation (Chicago)
Miasnikow, Igor. “Główne rosyjskie kierunki operacyjne w Europie i na Bliskim Wschodzie [Analiza]” [The main Russian operational directions in Europe and the Middle East (analysis)]. Geopolityczna Gra Mocarstw (LinkedIn newsletter), 25 March 2022.
08Podcast
The Historyczny Ambasador podcast I hosted in 2020–2021: conversations with experts, a review and an analysis.
Citation (Chicago)
Miasnikow, Igor. Depesza Dyplomaty. Podcast, 4 episodes. Historyczny Ambasador, 2020-2021. https://open.spotify.com/show/7GuZqsCXg0qOb3rde1IhdN.
Waldemar Skrzypczak
Leszek SykulskiFAQ
The thesis “Geostrategy and Economic Projects as Determinants of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in Eurasia” was written at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Gdańsk (Sopot 2019) under the supervision of Dr Monika Grottel. It explains the foreign policy of the Russian Federation through geopolitics and geoeconomics: energy and transport projects, A2/AD systems and information warfare as tools for rebuilding spheres of influence in Eurasia. From these premises it derives two development scenarios and specific forecasts.
As of 24 October 2026 I have checked 25 forecasts from the thesis. The result: confirmed – 10, partly accurate – 8, refuted – 7; the weighted hit rate is 56%. Forecasts derived from geography and military capabilities held up best, while the assumptions about energy interdependence between Russia and Europe fared worst. Every verdict on this page comes with its reasoning and open sources.
In part. The thesis forecast that a future war would be protracted, identified the goal of a “Novorossiya” reaching Transnistria and the mouth of the Danube, and pointed to an advance from the Kursk arc on Kyiv. It assumed, however, that Russia preferred to act below the threshold of open war, and it did not write up a full-scale invasion as a separate scenario.
It bears out two of its theses. The thesis assumed that US primacy was waning and that the United States could not balance its rivals on its own; the war with Iran, waged alongside support for Ukraine, is depleting American interceptor stocks and delaying deliveries to allies. It has also set off the mechanism of the first scenario: the United States is easing sanctions on Russia to bring fuel prices down, while deliveries to Ukraine, which needs American Patriot systems to defend itself against Russian ballistic missiles, are delayed. There is still no New Concert of Powers, however, and Russia is backing Iran.
In academic outlets: Zeszyty Studenckie “Nasze Studia”, Faculty of Economics, University of Gdańsk, no. 9 (2019); The Geopolitics of Russia and the Post-Soviet Area: Spheres of Influence (Geopolityka Rosji i obszaru postsowieckiego. Strefy wpływów), vol. 1, ed. Leszek Sykulski, Wydawnictwo Zona Zero (2020). Commentary appeared on the Historyczny Ambasador blog, in the podcast “Depesza Dyplomaty” (2020–2021) and in the LinkedIn newsletter “Geopolityczna Gra Mocarstw” (since 2022).
Yes. The best way is the form on this page (topic: Analysis) or an e-mail to igor.miasnikow@gmail.com with the region, the research question, the audience and the deadline.
Commissioned analysis
Tell me which region and question the analysis concerns, who will read it and when you need it.